I was writing to announce that week 3 of the month of Volatility plugins is finished, and we now have five more in-depth blog posts covering Windows and Linux internals and rootkit detection as well as a bonus plugin that analyzes Internet Explorer browsing history. These have all been posted on the Volatility Labs blog.
Post 1: Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem
This Windows focused post covers detecting malware hooks in the Windows GUI subsystem, including message hooks and event hooks, and what effects these hooks can have on a compromised system.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
Post 2: Shellbags in Memory, SetRegTime, and TrueCrypt Volumes
This Windows focused post covers finding and recovering shellbags from memory, the forensics importance of shellbags, and analyzes the effects of anti-forensics on shellbag timestamps. It concludes with covering the traces left in shellbags by TrueCrypt.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-32-shellbags-in-memory-setregtime.html
Post 3: Analyzing USER Handles and the Win32k.sys Gahti
This Windows focused post introduces two new plugins, one named gahti that determines the various different types of USER objects on a system and another named userhandles which traverses the handle table entries and associates them with the owning processes or threads
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-33-analyzing-user-handles-and.html
Post 4: Recovering tagCLIPDATA: What's In Your Clipboard?
This Windows focused post covers recovery of the Windows clipboard from physical memory.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-34-recovering-tagclipdata-whats-in.html
Post 5: Analyzing the 2008 DFRWS Challenge with Volatility
This Linux focused post analyzes the 2008 memory challenge with Volatility. It walks through the artifacts produced by the winning team and shows how to recover the same information with Volatility. It then shows plugins in Volatility that can recover artifacts not produced by the winning team.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-35-analyzing-2008-dfrws-challenge.html
Bonus Post: HowTo: Scan for Internet Cache/History and URLs
This Windows focused post covers how to recover Internet Explorer's cache and history from a memory sample.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/howto-scan-for-internet-cachehistory.html
If you have any questions or comments on the posts, please leave a comment on the respective post on the Volatility Labs blog.
Saturday, September 29, 2012
Week 3 of the Month of Volatility Plugins posted!
Cross listed from Andrew Case's blog:
Friday, September 21, 2012
Week 2 of the Month of Volatility Plugins posted!
It's been an exciting week in the Volatility community. We've just finished our second week of Month of Volatility Plugins (MoVP) blogposts, released Volatility 2.2 RC2 for testing, fixed a few minor bugs and now we're gearing up for our third week of posts and the upcoming Open Memory Forensics Workshop (OMFW). Here is a list of this week's posts, compiled by Andrew Case:
We hope you've enjoyed this week's series. Stay tuned, we have much more in store!
I was writing to announce that week 2 of the month of Volatility plugins is finished, and we now have five more in-depth blog posts covering Windows and Linux internals and rootkit detection. These have all been posted to the new Volatility Labs blog.
Post 1: Atoms (The New Mutex), Classes and DLL Injection
This Windows focused post covers investigating malware and understanding infections by analyzing the atom tables.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-21-atoms-new-mutex-classes-and-dll.html
Post 2: Malware in your Windows
This Windows focused post covers enumerating and analyzing windows in the GUI subsystem.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-22-malware-in-your-windows.html
Post 3: Event logs and Service SIDs
This Windows focused post demonstrates recovering event logs from memory and calculating service SIDs.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-23-event-logs-and-service-sids.html
Post 4: Analyzing the Jynx rootkit and LD_PRELOAD
This Linux focused post covers analyzing the Jynx rootkit as well as generic methods for analyzing LD_PRELOAD based rootkits.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-24-analyzing-jynx-rootkit-and.html
Post 5: Investigating In-Memory Network Data with Volatility
This Linux focused post goes through each of the Linux Volatility plugins related to recovering network data from memory, such as network connections, packets, and the routing cache.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-25-investigating-in-memory-network.html
If you have any questions or comments on the posts, please leave a comment on the respective post on the Volatility Labs blog.
We hope you've enjoyed this week's series. Stay tuned, we have much more in store!
Friday, September 14, 2012
Week 1 of the Month of Volatility Plugins posted!
I'm going to borrow from Andrew's blog here to let you know about our Month of Volatility Plugins:
Future Volatility posts will appear on our official blog (http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/). Also you might want to follow our project on twitter: @Volatility for updates and news. See you at OMFW!
I was writing to announce that week 1 of the month of Volatility plugins is finished, and we now have five in-depth blog posts covering Windows and Linux internals and rootkit detection. These have all been posted to the new Volatility Labs blog.
Post 1: Logon Sessions, Processes, and Images
This Windows focused post covers linking processes to their logon session, detecting hidden processes using session structures, and determining the loaded the drivers mapped into each session.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-11- logon-sessions-processes-and. html
Post 2: Window Stations and Clipboard Malware
This Windows focused post covers enumerating and analyzing window stations and clipboard monitoring malware.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-12- window-stations-and-clipboard. html
Post 3: Desktops, Heaps, and Ransomware
This Windows focused post covers finding rogue desktops used to hide applications and created by ransomware, linking threads to desktops, analyzing the desktop heap for memory corruptions, and profiling heap allocations to locate USER objects.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-13- desktops-heaps-and-ransomware. html
Post 4: Average Coder Rootkit, Bash History, and Elevated Processes
This Linux focused post covers analyzing the Average Coder rootkit, recovering .bash_history from memory, even when faced with anti-forensics, and finding elevated processes.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-14- average-coder-rootkit-bash. html
Post 5: KBeast Rootkit, Detecting Hidden Modules, and sysfs
This Linux focused post covers analyzing the KBeast rootkit, finding modules unlinked from the module list, and the forensic values of sysfs.
http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-15- kbeast-rootkit-detecting- hidden.html
If you have any questions or comments on the posts, please leave a comment on the respective post on the Volatility Labs blog.
Future Volatility posts will appear on our official blog (http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/). Also you might want to follow our project on twitter: @Volatility for updates and news. See you at OMFW!
Saturday, September 01, 2012
Job File Parser
While writing material for the Blackhat training course that Andrew Case and I gave this summer, I realized that there did not appear to be many tools that would parse job files. At that time, Harlan Carvey had written a blogpost on job files and had mentioned them in part of his timeline materials, but he had not yet released his Perl script (It has since been released here). This prompted me to write up a parser of my own in Python.
.job files consist of two sections: 1) Fixed Length and 2) Variable Length. The MSDN documentation is fairly good for letting us know how to parse out these sections.
So what does a .job file look like?
$ xxd At5.job 0000000: 0006 0100 e378 73f7 4d8b 2a45 a589 1cc5 .....xs.M.*E.... 0000010: fa64 cfd2 4600 cc00 0000 0000 3c00 0a00 .d..F.......<... 0000020: 2000 0000 0014 730f 0000 0000 0513 0400 .....s......... 0000030: 0200 e421 dc07 0700 0100 1000 0b00 1a00 ...!............ 0000040: 0000 0f00 0000 0400 6300 6d00 6400 0000 ........c.m.d... 0000050: 0f00 2f00 6300 2000 6e00 6f00 7400 6500 ../.c. .n.o.t.e. 0000060: 7000 6100 6400 2e00 6500 7800 6500 0000 p.a.d...e.x.e... 0000070: 0000 0700 5300 5900 5300 5400 4500 4d00 ....S.Y.S.T.E.M. 0000080: 0000 1e00 4300 7200 6500 6100 7400 6500 ....C.r.e.a.t.e. 0000090: 6400 2000 6200 7900 2000 4e00 6500 7400 d. .b.y. .N.e.t. 00000a0: 5300 6300 6800 6500 6400 7500 6c00 6500 S.c.h.e.d.u.l.e. 00000b0: 4a00 6f00 6200 4100 6400 6400 2e00 0000 J.o.b.A.d.d..... 00000c0: 0000 0800 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 3000 ..............0. 00000d0: 0000 dc07 0700 1000 0000 0000 0000 0b00 ................ 00000e0: 1a00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000f0: 0000 feff ffff fd68 7377 0000 0000 0100 .......hsw...... 0000100: 0100 0416 10dd 78d9 b300 f7f0 9b20 9bd8 ......x...... .. 0000110: a0c4 5108 c943 d5c9 c64f 47ea 6052 0349 ..Q..C...OG.`R.I 0000120: 23e1 e1ab 6815 e8ef 219e 6d3b aa88 1360 #...h...!.m;...` 0000130: 706b c27b 2e44 9db1 4e89 81ca dd0a 869e pk.{.D..N....... 0000140: 2b61 .6..
We can see the first section of the job file below:
0000000: 0006 0100 e378 73f7 4d8b 2a45 a589 1cc5 .....xs.M.*E.... 0000010: fa64 cfd2 4600 cc00 0000 0000 3c00 0a00 .d..F.......<... 0000020: 2000 0000 0014 730f 0000 0000 0513 0400 .....s......... 0000030: 0200 e421 dc07 0700 0100 1000 0b00 1a00 ...!............ 0000040: 0000 0f00 ....
The fixed length section is pretty straightforward (I will only fill in a few):
0-2 : Product Info (0x600 - Vista)
2-4 : File Version (0x1)
4-20 : UUID ({F77378E3-8B4D-452A-A589-1CC5FA64CFD2})
20-22: Application Name Offset (0x46)
22-24: Trigger Offset (0xcc)
24-26: Error Retry Count (0x00)
26-28: Error Retry Interval (0x00)
28-30: Idle Deadline (0x3c)
30-32: Idle Wait (0xa)
32-36: Priority
36-40: Maximum Runtime
40-44: Exit Code (0x0)
44-48: Status (0x41305)
48-52: Flags
52-68: Run Date (Monday Jul 16 11:26:00.15 2012)
The variable length section actually contains sizes (denoted in red below) before some of the data members mentioned in the MSDN documentation:
0000 0400 6300 6d00 6400 0000 ...c.m.d... 0000050: 0f00 2f00 6300 2000 6e00 6f00 7400 6500 ../.c. .n.o.t.e. 0000060: 7000 6100 6400 2e00 6500 7800 6500 0000 p.a.d...e.x.e... 0000070: 0000 0700 5300 5900 5300 5400 4500 4d00 ....S.Y.S.T.E.M. 0000080: 0000 1e00 4300 7200 6500 6100 7400 6500 ....C.r.e.a.t.e. 0000090: 6400 2000 6200 7900 2000 4e00 6500 7400 d. .b.y. .N.e.t. 00000a0: 5300 6300 6800 6500 6400 7500 6c00 6500 S.c.h.e.d.u.l.e. 00000b0: 4a00 6f00 6200 4100 6400 6400 2e00 0000 J.o.b.A.d.d..... 00000c0: 0000 0800 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 3000 ..............0. 00000d0: 0000 dc07 0700 1000 0000 0000 0000 0b00 ................ 00000e0: 1a00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000f0: 0000 feff ffff fd68 7377 0000 0000 0100 .......hsw...... 0000100: 0100 0416 10dd 78d9 b300 f7f0 9b20 9bd8 ......x...... .. 0000110: a0c4 5108 c943 d5c9 c64f 47ea 6052 0349 ..Q..C...OG.`R.I 0000120: 23e1 e1ab 6815 e8ef 219e 6d3b aa88 1360 #...h...!.m;...` 0000130: 706b c27b 2e44 9db1 4e89 81ca dd0a 869e pk.{.D..N....... 0000140: 2b61 .6..
Going over some of the data above we have:
Running instance count
Command Name Length (0x4 - includes ending '\x00')
Command Name (cmd )
Parameter length (0xf)
Parameter (/c notepad.exe )
Working Directory Length (0x0)
Working Directory (if Working Directory Length > 0)
User Name Length (0x7)
User Name (SYSTEM)
Comment Length (0x1e)
Comment (if Comment length > 0 - Created by NetScheduleJobAdd. )
User Data / Reserved data
Trigger count
Triggers
- Scheduled date (Jul 16 11:26:00.0 2012)
Job Signature
So I am releasing a job file parser script that can parse out almost all of these items mentioned above. You can find it here. The only things left off are the user/reserved data, some of the trigger data and the job signature sections. I have only tested this on 32 bit *nix systems, so let me know if you hit issues on another platforms. You can see an example output of the above job file below:
$ python jobparser.py -f At5.job Product Info: Windows Vista File Version: 1 UUID: {F77378E3-8B4D-452A-A589-1CC5FA64CFD2} Maximum Run Time: 72:00:00.0 (HH:MM:SS.MS) Exit Code: 0 Status: Properties not set Flags: TASK_FLAG_DONT_START_IF_ON_BATTERIES Date Run: Monday Jul 16 11:26:00.15 2012 Running Instances: 0 Application: cmd Parameters: /c notepad.exe Working Directory: Working Directory not set User: SYSTEM Comment: Created by NetScheduleJobAdd. Scheduled Date: Jul 16 11:26:00.0 2012
Here is some output of job files taken from a Windows 2008 machine:
$ python jobparser.py -d Tasks/ ************************************************************************ File: Tasks/At1.job Product Info: Windows Vista File Version: 1 UUID: {CE14B659-4115-4263-BFAD-A8318428AB68} Maximum Run Time: 72:00:00.0 (HH:MM:SS.MS) Exit Code: 0 Status: Properties not set Flags: TASK_FLAG_DONT_START_IF_ON_BATTERIES Date Run: Task not yet run Running Instances: 0 Application: notepad.exe Working Directory: Working Directory not set User: SYSTEM Comment: Created by NetScheduleJobAdd. Scheduled Date: Jul 17 02:20:00.0 2012 ************************************************************************ ************************************************************************ File: Tasks/At2.job Product Info: Windows Vista File Version: 1 UUID: {46F61E52-4581-49A9-9AD0-2244C206AEEB} Maximum Run Time: 72:00:00.0 (HH:MM:SS.MS) Exit Code: 0 Status: Properties not set Flags: TASK_FLAG_DONT_START_IF_ON_BATTERIES Date Run: Task not yet run Running Instances: 0 Application: notepad.exe Working Directory: Working Directory not set User: SYSTEM Comment: Created by NetScheduleJobAdd. Scheduled Date: Jul 16 14:20:00.0 2012 ************************************************************************
And here are a couple of XP Tasks, notice that one has "Running Instances" value of "1", this was copied when the command was currently running:
************************************************************************ File: Solitaire.job Product Info: Windows XP File Version: 1 UUID: {3824DDBB-A037-4016-B99A-28BD95D429AF} Maximum Run Time: 72:00:00.0 (HH:MM:SS.MS) Exit Code: 0 Status: Task has not run Flags: TASK_FLAG_INTERACTIVE, TASK_FLAG_DELETE_WHEN_DONE Date Run: Monday Aug 13 12:37:00.10 2012 Running Instances: 1 Application: C:\WINDOWS\system32\sol.exe Working Directory: C:\WINDOWS\system32 User: user Comment: Comment not set Scheduled Date: Aug 13 12:37:00.0 2012 ************************************************************************ ************************************************************************ File: Solitaire2.job Product Info: Windows XP File Version: 1 UUID: {3824DDBB-A037-4016-B99A-28BD95D429AF} Maximum Run Time: 72:00:00.0 (HH:MM:SS.MS) Exit Code: 0 Status: Task is ready to run Flags: TASK_FLAG_INTERACTIVE, TASK_FLAG_DELETE_WHEN_DONE Date Run: Monday Aug 13 12:37:00.10 2012 Running Instances: 0 Application: C:\WINDOWS\system32\sol.exe Working Directory: C:\WINDOWS\system32 User: user Comment: Comment not set Scheduled Date: Aug 13 12:37:00.0 2012 ************************************************************************
References:
[1] Windows Forensic Analysis 2nd Ed., Harlan Carvey
[2] .JOB File Format, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc248285%28v=prot.13%29.aspx
[3] Windows Scheduler (at job) Forensics, http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2009/09/16/windows-scheduler-at-job-forensics
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